(not unlike gays and lesbians) whose rights have been curtailed or denied (Cragune ta l. 2012). Such efforts maybeh aving an effect.R eferences to atheists (or nonbelievers), even in the American 'publics quare',h aveb ecome noticeably more frequent and prominent -such as, for example, President Barack Obama's inclusion of nonbelievers in his first inaugural address (Grossman 2009 ) and references to 'agnostic and atheist brothers and sisters' by speakers at anti-capitalist rallies( Landsberg2 011).
Nevertheless,until quiterecentlysociologicalworkonsecularizationvirtually ignoreda ctiveo ro rganized formso fa theism andt he myriad of others ecularist constructs or thoset hats hare criticismo rr ejection of religious ideas, behavior, or institutions, such as freethought, secularh umanism, skepticism,p ositivism, andp hilosophical materialismo rn aturalism (Pasquale2 007; 2010). ColinC ampbell noted '[t] hef actt hati rreligious movementsa ct as agents of secularization hass trangely enough been overlooked by sociologists in theirc ontributiont o thec ontinuingsecularization debate […] one hast osearchhardtofindexamples of sociologists referringt om ateriala bout irreligion in this context ' (1971: 7) .A s Beckfords ummarizedt he matter: [T] hey have tended to overlook, omit or deliberately ignore the significanceo fboth organized and diffuse attacks on religion. It is as if the progress of secularization could be adequatelyaccounted for in terms of the effect of abstract culturalforces, such as class struggle or functionaldifferentiation, without consideration of the agents and agencies that actively campaigned for secularism and secular societies.G iven that aw ide rangeo fc ampaigns, movements and voluntary associationspromoted secularism, rationalism, atheism and humanism in Britain and elsewhere, it is important to consider their direct and indirect contributionst os ecularization and to interpretations of secularization. (2003:36) It could be argued that in the U.S. the paucity of scholarlyattention to organized secularism until recentlyw as justified because it reflected the societal reality of the lack of institutionalization and divisions that has bedeviled free thinkers and secularistsi nt he U.S. for more than ac entury. Onlyasmall percentageo ft he millions who could be identified as Seculars belong to explicitlys ecularist groups.Inf act,secularism could be described as aclassic leaderless movement in America (Cragun&Fazzino, this volume). Despitea cceleratingg rowth in recent years, numbers of atheist and secularist group affiliates have always been, and remain, extremelys mall-not onlyw ith respect to the populations of the societies in which they emerge,but with respect to thosepeople who reasonablymay be characterized as substantiallyorthoroughly nonreligious (Budd 1977; C ampbell 1971) . Historicallyevend uringp eriods of substantiallydeclining religiosity such as the 1930s and 1960s, secularist organizations failed to capitalize on their opportunityw ith even remotelyp roportionate growth rates (Demer-ath and Thiessen 1966; Warren 1943) . As SteveBruce (2002) and John Shook (this volume) have suggested, the natural restings tate of secularityt ends to be passive indifference to religion, apatheism, rather than active atheism or irreligion.
Secularist organizations (like the American Humanist Association, Council for Secular Humanism, Freedom From Religion Foundation and American Atheists) have been advocating secularization in the United States for decades, particularlyaswatchdogsregardinginfringement of constitutional church-state separation. While their activities has triggered skirmishes with religious advocates along the way, incremental increases in the population of Noness eem more attributable to cultural, political, or demographic factors than to organized intentional activity.Asurge of religious abandonment in the 1960s and 70s, for example, was largely attributable to developmental adolescent apostasy in the Baby Boom generation (Putnam and Campbell 2010) . Some Baby Boomers returned to organized religion but manyd id not,g iving wayt oi ncreasing proportions of 'Nones' in succeeding cohorts as future generations weren ot raised in ar eligion. Hout and Fischer concluded that 'changeinthe religious preferences of believers in the 1990s contributed more to the increase in no religious preference than disbelief did ' (2002: 178) .
Much like organized religion, secularism is ad iverse and pluralist tradition producing competingvisions and organizations. Or,alternatively and negatively, it can be pictured as aweak worldview movement rent by lack of consensus on definitions and goals from its inception (Rectenwald, Mastiaux, this volume). Secularism has had asectarian quality since its beginningsbecause of the manner in which diversityo fp hilosophicala pproach to "human consciousness" as demonstratedi nt he Shook'se laborate taxonomy( this volume) weret ranslated into calls for social and political action with regard to religion. This uncertainty has produced av ariety of binaries thatc an be described as "soft" and "hard" secularism (Kosmin2007). On one sidei st he "substitutionist" or "accommadationist" tradition of Holyoake, Huxley and Dewey,a nd before them the "soft" thinkers of the Enlightenment,s uch as John Locke, Adam Smith, and Thomas Jefferson, whose view of humanity led them to doubt that secularization would be sweeping,t horough and total. The SundayA ssembly( see chapters by Smith and Frost in this volume) mayb es een as ac ontemporary illustration of this tradition. On the "hard" side standsthe "eliminationist" and "confrontationist" tradition of "out Atheists" likeB radlaugh, Marxist-Leninists and nowadays the New Atheists (Campbell 1971,5 4) . The Atheist Alliance and the American Atheists (see chapters by Mastiaux, and Fazzino&Cragun in this volume) are contemporary examples of this second type.
Disagreements over strategya nd style reflect these longstanding and deep ideological divisionsa mong secularists (Richter and Langston this volume). In the contemporary U.S. the degree to which active atheism, particularlya sa dvocated by the New Atheism, mayhavecontrary effects -promptingreligious backlash, promotion, and reactionary adherence -cannot be discounted (Bullivant 2010; K osmin 2014b) . This hostility to atheism as ar esult of its radical image, of course, is longstandinga nd consistent with the teachings of John Lockei n AL etter Concerning Toleration (1689). As in the past,t his negative reaction prompts debate and disagreementa mong secularistso fv aryings tripes (e. g., Baggini 2007; K urtz 2010; U hl 2011) . 'Moderates' often advocatingapositive free standing secularism complain that acerbic or absolutist 'shock and awetactics. .. polarize identities' and push otherwise moderate religious allies 'into the arms of the extremists' (Baggini 2007:4 2, 44) .
In the U.S. onlyatinyp ercentageo ff reethinkers have ever been affiliated with secular organizations whereas around 60 %ofthe religious population currentlybelongst oacongregation (Kosmin and Keysar 2009 ). The low rates of affiliation, mobilization and participation is even more problematic in the current circumstances of arapid increase in the potential constituencyfor organized secularism. This deficiencyi saf amiliar theme in secularist gatheringsw heret he "faithful faithless" lament the failureo fn on-theist organizations to realize their full political and cultural potential-their inability to penetrate and mobilize theirnatural market.Secularist organizations todayasinthe past do indeed face asocial marketingproblem as the preceding chapters directlyand indirectly evidence. Organized secularism in the U.S. has failed to affiliate even af raction of the moret han 10 million strongc orec onstituencyo fs elf-identifying non-believers -the "hard secularists" (Kosmin 2007) , those willing to self-identifya s atheists and agnostics.U singw ider theological or (un)belief criteria as by set out in Shook's "polysecularism" this targetg roup could be even al argera nd more sizeable demographic amounting to one in four Americans accordingt o the findingso fr ecent national surveys.S ecularist organizations have no real need to proselytize since they alreadyhavea50 million strongpotential constituency of Nones. Organic economic and societalf orces have created this social momentumtowardsmasssecularity.Thusthe present challengefor secularist organizations is not to produce growth but buildingt he self-awareness and the mobilization of this population. The result of this lack of mobilization and structural weakness is most evident in the political arena where identifying Nones are almostnon-existent and so the most under-represented population in the country in terms of political office holders.
2R ecruitmenta nd OrganizationalC hallenges
The religiosity of the United States, compared with other developeds ocieties, can be attributed to a 'supply-side' proliferation of religious products in ac omparativelyf ree market.S ecularism seems to have as imilar trajectory (Kosmin and Keysar 2006) . We can explain the sectarian syndrome of proliferating small secular groups,byapplying an economic market model to secular choices that parallels the religious marketplace. When free of monopolistic or governmental control, religious products naturallyp roliferate to satisfy multiple needs and varyingt astes.T he demographic profile of secularist activists is heavy with educators and intellectuals. This means secular organizations spend lot of time and energy on mission statements and discussion of principles often without reachingc onsensus.B ut manym ore non-activist secularists remain unaffiliated.
There is an obvious need to explain the paradoxofrapidlygrowingnumbers of Nonesa longside onlyaslight uptick in secular organization affiliates and so the weakness of organized secularism. The most significant cause is thatm ost Nones are Apatheistsa si ndifferent and uninterested in secularism as they are in religion (see Langston, Shook this volume). Individuallythey have undergone asecularization of consciousness in that they have lost anysense of sin, concern for dayo fj udgement,a fterlife, heavena nd hell and manyt raditionals ocial taboos. Yetp aradoxicallyt he rise of "individuation and personalization" (Hoesly this volume) has inhibited affiliation with overtlys ecularist organizations. Presumably, one constraint for most Nones is that manyo ft heir immediate family and friends are believers. In fact,inU .S. society most discrimination and hostility against non-believers arises from familya nd friends rather than strangers in institutional settings ( Cragun et al. 2011) .
The lack of consensus over nomenclature and boundaries highlighted in this volume reflects the tensions among secular people over secular identities. Atypologybased on "state of individual consciousness" produces abinary model of hard and soft secularisms (Kosmin 2007) . This bifurcation of secular perspectives on philosophya nd religion comprises onlyo ne dimension of this typology. The second dimension is basedo nt he distinction between individuals and institutions. Heret he individual aspect primarilyp ertains to states of consciousness while the institutional aspect relates to social structures and their cultural systems.I nr eality,these are not closed cells but ranges stretched between the polarities of the dimensions. Arangeo fi ntermediate positions can and does exist between soft-soft and hard-hards ecularism. In addition, the boundaryb etween the individual and the institutions is not firm in real life. There is interplayt hat Old Questions and New Issues forO rganized Secularism in the United States involves social expectations and constraints originating from institutions on the one hand and extreme subjective mental states thata re individuallyb asedo n the other.G iven the intellectualism of secularists the outcome of all this is a predilection for sectarianism (Fazzino &C ragun, this volume).
The pioneering research on affiliation and membershippatterns among secularistsb yF rank Pasquale (2007) highlighted this trend towardss ectarianism. Nones tend to be individualists and skeptical of the value of organizations. They werenever the typeswho joined the Elks, Rotarians and Masons, the traditional fraternal membership organizations, which are on the decline in the contemporary world of bowlinga lone.T he character of the secular impulse itself tends to militate against institutional participation specificallyo nt he basis of metaphysical world views. Pasquale goes as far as to suggest that manynon-believers are "conflicted" about their own individual preferences and motives(Pasquale 2010:2 ). Another factor that militates against affiliating most Nones is their individual psychological profile. They tend to be rather analytic and critical. They have difficulty endorsing standard statements of opinion. They would rather dissect and discuss than offer straight positions. Most dislike labels and labeling. Whereas atheists tend to be confident in their identity and hold strident opinions, by wayo fc ontrastt he more numerous agnostics,h umanists, and 'softer secularists",h old to more moderate and qualified opinions. Their openness to alternativesa nd unwillingness to commit to as ingle viewpoint makes them particularlyh ard to organize. Thus secularism unsurprisingly has no official hierarchyorleadership. The obvious contrast to this semi-anarchic situation among free thinkers is the authoritarianp ersonality types found in fundamentalist religious groups (Ellison and Sherkat 1993) , composed of individuals who are anxious to submit to an authority and to follow acharismatic and often disciplinarian leader.
The notion thats ecularizationi slinked to ap reference for autonomyf inds support elsewherea sw ell. Langston'sr esearch (this volume) tends to discredit ideological barriers and point out the psychological disposition and structural weaknesses and fractures thatc haracterize secular organizations. Similarly, Bruce (2002) views the process of secularization as an individual process. While it can be characterized as affecting large collectivities, the decision to be secular is not ad ecision that is made at the group level. ForB ruce, this decision is reachedo na ni ndividual level. Each single individual makes up his or her own mind, however affected they mayb eb yo thers, and therefore they all experience secularization as affirming their individual autonomy. The relationship of leaders to led is difficult because Nones tend to be suspicious of charisma and authority.Heightened individualism creates amentality (if not the politics) wherebyamajority is more libertarianthancommunitarian in organizational outlook.F or example, Mastiaux(this volume)showedthere is alarge pool of secular sympathizers butt here is al acko fs ecular missionaries.
Obviously, the small size of secularist organizations means al ack of resources and professionals (clergy). This in turn weakens recruitment efforts so there is little outreach activity.Another indicator of institutional weakness is apaucity of donors, particularlylarge givers, to subsidize outreach. This deficiencymeans secular organizations have to rely on self-recruitment largely (Mastiaux, Schultz, Smith, Frost,this volume) and on social media. As ar esultt herei sl ittle face to face engagement.D eT ocqueville sawv oluntary organization as as trength and uniqueness of American society.Y et most types of membership organizations e. g. trades unions, fraternalo rganizations such as Elks, Masons etc. are in decline and suffer from the bowlingalone syndrome that weakens manyvoluntary organizations today ( Putnam,2000) . Still, this is ap articular problem for ac ontemporary movement that lacks inherited infrastructurea nd plant.
Added to thoseproblems is the fact thatmost voluntary organizations are hit by burn out and turnover.Thisisafeature even of the student organizations SSA and CFI on collegec ampuses. They operate in friendlym arkets with ac onstituency unburdenedb yf amilya nd job responsibilities but they face ad ifficult migratory structure namely af ast turnover of volunteer leadership (McGraw 2016). Todayo rganized secularism faces ac hallengei nh ow to decide how to use to best advantaget he groundswell of popular sentiment and opinion and the organic, secular trends in society and economy. We have to realize that membership organizations are hard to maintain and resource in today'ss ociety if you are not offering tangibles,p ower or salvation to your followers;i ft he goal is to fight for their hearts and minds but not their souls. Rational choice theorists (Stark 1999; Stark and Bainbridge 1985) arguethat human beingspervasively depend upon the supernatural 'compensators' offered by salvational religion for unfulfilledw orldlye xpectations and rewards. If true, that reality requires secularists to learn new ways and techniques to acquirep eople'sl oyalty.
The role of the Internet in creatingn etworks of seculars into new organizational formsisaparamount concern for secular organizations. But how does that translate into changingp eople'ss ense of belongingo ri dentification, which is necessary to grow amovement?The emergence of digital technologies (internet, social media) -another structural (or infrastructural) factor -is likelyplaying a role, particularlya mong the young (Addington, this volume). Ay oungd emographic is not hidebound by tradition so they are earlya dopters of technology. Atheists are ar are population, ag eographicallyd ispersed minority in manyl ocations. Younger cohorts,inparticular, who wereweanedonthe Webare considered ideal for creating 'imagined communities' and virtual movements through blogs, Internet-organized 'meet-ups', 'tweets' and 'open posts' (Cimino and Smith 2011; S mith and Cimino 2012) . These new media are enablinga theistic messages to reach largera udiences, no matter how remote or culturallyi nsulated. How far this trend can overcomet he face-to-face deficiencies onlyt ime will tell.
Another methodology which has been adopted by organized secularism recentlyispublic signaling -stickers,flags, tee-shirts, advertising posters on buses and on the highwaysand Reason Rallies. In 2014 several secularist organizations joined togethert oc reateanew "OpenlyS ecular" initiative (Openlysecular.org). The outragea nd grievancep eddling described by Mastiaux (this volume) as "moral Shock" is best seen in the FFRF strategyofseeking legal fights in middle America,s uing local governments, schoolb oards and police departments over prayers and religious symbols infringingt he separation of church and state.
As we have noted, Nones tend to be individualists,n ot joiners. Most Nones also tend towards being political independents but that is not entirelyt rue of secular activists. The profile of the leaders and members of secular organizations is an important factor in the imageand appeal. Activist secularists and the leadership are overwhelminglym ale, white, well educated, older,a nd affluent (Keysar,2007) . The social majority of secular activists in terms of race, education, age and income, regardless of wheret hey live,h as all the characteristics consistent with political conservatism and country club membership, or so one would think. The reality is otherwise. Fore xample, 64 %o ft he readers of the Council for Secular Humanism'sofFree Inquiry self-identified in 2015 as Liberals or Progressives(TomFlynn 2016). AA and AHAmembers tend to be even more likelyto be social and political progressives(Fazzino &Cragun, this volume). This overlap between political liberalism and public secularityc an be expected to deepen under the Trump administration.
Nevertheless,g ender differences and minorityr epresentationa re important differentiators that help explain the profile of identification groups and organizations. Ment end to be more militantt hanwomen and thatf actor is said to inhibit female recruitment.This has led to calls for more diversity by gender and race. So CFI has sponsored threeW omen in Secularism Conferences and AHA and CFI have established sub-groups for African-Americans. There is some recognition among secular activists of generational issues and an emphasis on recruiting Millenials. Indeedt he student generation is very sympathetic to secularism but few seem to have the time or inclination to be activists, the interest to purchase secularist publications, or the resources to be donors (Kosmin 2014c) .
As regardsH ispanics and Asians,s ecular organizations are myopic. Research such as the Institute for the StudyofS ecularism in Society and Culture's (ISSSC) reportonLatinos, has been ignored by secular organizations (Navarro et al). This failureepitomizes the short-sightedness problem of secularist organiza-tions and their obliviousness to important facts and opportunities. The findings show thatdespite the stereotype of Latinosbeing anaturallyreligious community there is anew and expanding constituencyofNones among collegeeducated and English-speaking Latinos. These people are totallyi nvisiblet ot he media, scholars and unfortunately to most secular organizations. The explanation is that they fail to fit the common stereotypeofthe religious Latino. That prejudice is explicable for the media that loves stereotypes and values exoticism and photogenic Catholic processions but secular organizations lose whenthey ignoresocial reality.The samed eficiencyr eappearsi nt heirf ailuret oo utreach to AsianAmericans who ISSSC research has repeatedlyidentified as the most secularized population group in the country.I ns hort,t he leadership profile and membership rankso fo rganized secularism appear unlikelyt ob et ransformed in the near future.
3C ongregation and Community Models
The membership of religious congregations in the U.S. has ademographic profile very different from that of the secular organizations -older whitemales -as described above. The churches tend to disproportionallyattract rural dwellers,A frican-Americans, older women and youngf amilies (Kosmin and Keysar 2006; Manning 2015) . The secular SundayA ssemblies' constituencyd escribed by Smith and Frost (this volume) appears different again, having ad istinct social background and psychological profile mainlycomposed of urban young singles, the proverbial Yuppies. Yetthese "seekers" of groupness and community are very much aminority of the secular Nones (Schutz, Smith, this volume). This population'sn eed for the support of others is often derided by the majority of the activist seculars, with their more individualistica nd autonomous personalitiesp articularlyby"out Atheists" with grievances against religion or escapingwhat they see as personal trauma causedbyreligion. As we have noted expressive individualism is more common thancollectivism among Nones. Nevertheless the Sunday Assemblym ovement has attracted attentionf rom the media. It is regarded as a strategythatmight overcome the problems and constraints of organized secularism with recruitment described above. Apparentlyt he new technology and media workwell for SundayAssemblies as they do for Evangelicals. These movements are not as burdened by complicated and clergy-focused rituals as are Catholic and Orthodox Christianity,J udaism and Hinduism (Addington, this volume).
Historicallyt he American population has been socialized to see the Protestant congregational model as normative.The cultural hegemonyoforganized re-ligion and Christianitym eans thatN on-Christian traditions, Jews, Buddhist, Muslims and Hindus have adopted this congregational structure in America. The SundayA ssembly'sp articularo rganizational structure is the layl ed Protestant denominationwith al iberalm odel of standardized services and notions of voluntary work towardst he "common good".The medium is the message.The SundayA ssemblyh as adopted af amiliar Protestant Christian format and style geared to its constituencyo fy oungR ecovering Protestants meeting in ad econsecrated church on aS undaym orning.
Of course an organizational model of secularized congregations parallel to organized religion has been tried before by Ethical Culture, Humanistic Judaism and the Unitarians but it did not taken off as am ass movement.One reason is that Secular Humanism and atheism have found it difficult to easilyr eproduce the familya nd generational nexus of ties that religion offers. If the SundayA ssemblyi st os ucceed it will need to provide the social provision typical of religious congregations such as welfarea nd charity workand earlychildhood education (Manning 2015). Secular ceremonies and life cycle rituals are obvious next steps.The Assemblies' predicament is whether to follow the Humanistic Judaism and Ethical Culture model and label themselvesa sar eligion with clergy,t hus gainingt he attendant tax and legal advantages, or to utilizet he Universal Life Church fiction (Hoesly this volume). Yetm anys ecularists value radical purity and the sectarian and fissiparous tendencies that plague secularism have alreadyaffected the Assemblymovement with the rise of the "splitters" of Godless Revival (Smith; Fazzino and Cragun, this volume) It is worth placing the SundayA ssemblyi nthec omparative context of the earlier efforts at secular congregationalism because it provides insights into the particulard ilemmaso rganized secularism faces.E thical Culture( American Ethical Union) was founded by Felix Adler in New York City in 1877.A dler was ad econverted rabbi and son of aR eform Rabbi. Very much a "progressive" he organized Sundaymeetingsinanattempt to offer amore universalistic, ethnicity free inclusive organization. Ethical Cultureoffered life cycle rituals. Itsmotto was "deed not creed" and it was geared to urban social action sponsoringakindergarten, school and housing and philanthropic projects (Radest 1969) . Humanistic Judaism, the "SaturdayAssembly"-aJ udaism without God-was foundedin Michigan in 1963byRabbi Sherwin Wine (Rowens 2004). It has 30 congregations and 10,000 members in the U.S. Compared to Ethical Culture and the SundayAssemblyi ts services offers more ritualistic ceremoniest hat reflect the heritageo f the audience, includingcensored traditional Hebrew texts.I tissocially progressive,w elcomes "intermarried" couples and operates gender equality (Chalom 2010) .
The secular congregations mayb ev iewed as close to Comte'sv ision of religions of humanity. And their placement on the soft sideo fs ecularism makes them open to joining ecumenical religious coalitions and civic alliances with liberal religious traditions and so fitting into the civicl ife of mainstream America. The public'sd emandfor life cycle rituals and particularlystate recognized marriagec eremonies encouraged Humanistic Judaism and Ethical Culturet oc laim official status as religions and recruit clergy as state recognized marriageo fficers.T hat strategyp rovides tax privileges (e. g. clergy parsonaget ax relief) and legal autonomyf or the congregation (the same fiction described by Hoesly for the ULF). The exploitation of unique U.S. constitutional provisions particularly freedom from financial supervision (e. g. exemption from the the need to submit IRS Form 990 that applies to other non-profit organizations) favors organized religion and disadvantages organized secularism unless it compromises. Oneresponse is to establish secular celebrant training program and severals ecularist organizations have begun campaigns for state recognition (e. g. Indiana 2016). Alongsidet hat,t hey can fight for al evel playing field and true equality e. g. the FFRF claim for parsonaget ax relief (FreethoughtT oday, Vol3 3N o5June/ July 2016).
Burial and death rituals are less subject to state intervention than marriage licensingb ut consumerism and market forces are more at play. The ARIS 2008 finding,which discovered that 27 %o fA mericans do not expectt oh aveareligious funeral, was as urprise. But it was noted by funerald irectors and that industry has responded to market forces such as the rising demandf or cremation (ThePittsburgh Post-Gazette, 8. 21.2015 ) Structural forces such as the existenceof an established industry makes it difficult for secular organizations to exploit the rising preference for non-religious interment.Asecular community can offer support and consolation in bereavement but this remains af amily arena and most families stillhaveareligious majority that sees secular "toolkits" as having an emotional deficit (MacMurray,t his volume) compared with traditionalr eligious burial and mourning rituals.
4A ppropriationo ft he CivicS quare
One of the weaknesses of organized secularism is its lack of imagination and opportunism in claiming territory and furtheringits cause using the existing agencies thatadvancethe common good in society.Organized secularism'sm yopia is probablydue to its fractured nature and poor leadership. In fact,awider notion of secularism with more extravagant claims is possiblea nd this could make it more recognizeda nd mainstream in society.F or example, secularists have not focused recentlyonthe role of the public school as amass secularizing and secular organization. The philosopher John Dewey sawt his opportunityt ou se the Americanp ublic school to promote ad emocratic secular education based on freedom, equality, social cohesion and commitment to Human Rights as against the separatism and religious segregation of faith schools (Dewey 1916) .
Campbell concluded that '[t]he irreligious movementsofthe nineteenth and twentieth centuries assistedinthe secularization of society in the sense that they promoted and accelerated the disengagement of various social institutions and activities from the legitimation and control of religion ' (1971:121-122) .M ost sociologists who studied these phenomena characterized them as loose-knit or ideologically 'diffuse' (Budd 1967) , organizationally 'precarious' (Demerath and Thiessen 1966) , frequentlyshort-lived, and of negligible significanceoverall. Campbell attributed these judgmentst oatendency to approach these phenomena with religious (read: Christian) organizations in mind. This, he argued, is inappropriate.I tobscuresthe distinctive social forms and activities through which such constructs have playedsecularizing roles.These tend to be task-specific, educational, political, or associational (rather than communal). As such they have more in common with labor unions, political movements, or advocacy groups than with churchc ongregations or communities.C ampaigns against religious blasphemyl aws, challenges to science,o rm oral legislation and for churchstate separation or rights to privacya nd alternative lifestyles have undoubtedly had some secularizing( and liberalizing or individualizing) effects.
An obviousa rena for enhancing secularization has been sports and recreation. In 1934 religion, i. e. the churches,l ost the struggle against Sundayp rofessional baseball (Bevis 2003) . The growinginfluenceofmajor sports corporations in the transformation of Sundayi sb est expressed in the history of the National Football League'sS uper Bowl. It has been playedonS undaysince 1967and it is now widelyrecognized as anational secular holiday (MacCambridge 2004) . The Olympic Movement,with its ethos and hymn, can alsob ee nvisaged as part of the international secular realm. Sports competew ith religious activities in time use and under Title IX it emancipates women to the detrimentofconservative religions.
Whether the emphasis is on science, politics or anyo ther area of life, it seems thats ecularists support efforts, public or private, thatj ustify their belief systems and advance society in the direction they believei ts hould go,w hich is almostwithout exceptioninthe wayofprogress.Inthis view,old and outdated ways of thinking,often entrenched in religion, are just anchors that hold society back from that progress.Secularists' relationship to the arts and culture is akey area of potential strength-and one that challenges the German sociologist Max Weber'sdictum that the process of secularization in the West was part of the dis-enchantment of the world, aprocess whereby magic and mystery werebanished from the mainstream of our culture (Weber 1905) . Such criticism of modernity and the associated triumph of science and rationalism, maintains that asecular society and cultureh as no place for the spiritual, the sublime or the romantic. Yetavisit to anyo ft he nation'sm useums and art galleries dispels this conclusion. These public institutions are secular shrines and places of deep meaningin contemporaryc ulture. Americans view museums, art galleries and public libraries as places of awea nd reverencec haracterized by silence and decorum. The secularizinginfluenceofscience and natural history museums is obvious, otherwise therewould be no need for arival Bible-oriented Creation Museum in Kentucky.
Most public museums' mission statements reflect the heritageo fR enaissance-style humanism and the Enlightenment,the essentialh arbingers of secularism. Museums do an excellent job of conveying secular values by stating their hopes to inspire people of all backgrounds by imbuing them with ag reater appreciation for human achievement and diversity.T he nation'sc ulturali nstitutions espousep luralistic values and court broad audiences implicitly offering visitors,f rom every background ac hance to connect with one another through dialogue and shared experiencesw ith the arts. The impulset ou niversalize goes hand in hand with the tendencyt os ecularize. One can seem useums as temples of as ort: temples of culturea nd memory.O lder museums are notable for their classical i. e. pre-Christian architecture. The contemporary museum is often heavy on glass,suggesting the absence of boundaries, again avery secular concept.
Similarly earlyp ublice xpressions of the secular with ac lear aim and purpose, bothpersonal and civic, werethe higher educational institutions, inspired by the Enlightenment.A gain visually,t hey tended to looked back to classical pre-Christian Greek models symbolized in architecture e. g. Doric columns. The prime example is Jefferson'sUniversity of Virginia 1818, an "academicalvillage" and "temple of knowledge" inspired by his passion for Palladiana rchitecture and Greek philosophers. Likewise the utilitarian philosopher JeremyB entham was the "spiritual founder" of the entirelys ecular UniversityC ollegeL ondon (1826) the "godless college" thatended the hitherto Anglican religious monopoly of university education in England. UCL unsurprisingly was the first to admit students regardless of their religion and the first to admit women on equal terms with men.
Unfortunately, the inability of secularists and secular organizations to assert themselvesa st he guardians of highc ulture and of the heritageo fc ivic cultural institutions alsohas linkagestotheirpaucity of languageand failuretocreatea uniquelys ecular vocabulary:
